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Rethinking Russian pan-Slavism in the Ottoman Balkans: N.P.
Ignatiev and the Slavic Benevolent Committee (1856–77)
Aslı Yigit G€ulseven
History Department, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey
The period between the Crimean War of 1853–56 and the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78
was one of the most important periods to leave its mark on the second half of the nine-
teenth century. This interwar period significantly affected international developments
across Eastern Europe, Russia and the Ottoman Empire at the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury and beginning of the twentieth century. In that period, the dominant feature of Rus-
sian foreign policy towards the Ottoman Balkans was its pan-Slavic inclinations. Russian
official policy in that period, however, was distant from the pan-Slavic movement. The
principal reason for this discrepancy was the pan-Slavic policies pursued by Russian
Ambassador to Constantinople Nikolai Pavlovich Ignatiev and the Slavic Benevolent Com-
mittee, which ultimately shaped Russia’s Balkan policy. Thus, in analysing Russia’s Balkan
policy in the interwar period, these two actors deserve particular attention.
From the early twentieth century onwards, a number of scholarly studies have
addressed the subject of Russia’s pan-Slavic policies in the nineteenth century. These stud-
ies have, for the most part, either described the general political situation in Europe and
the Balkans or focused on specific national, cultural or event-based themes. In Russia,
many archives were only opened in the early 1990s. Therefore, prior to that time most
studies on pan-Slavism did not incorporate Russian archival sources, or they could only
benefit from the archives of other states.1 These early studies focused on Russian expan-
sionist policies and the pan-Slavic views of Russian philosophers and writers such as Niko-
lai Yakovlevich Danilevskii, Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoevskii, Ivan Sergeevich Aksakov and
Rostislav Andreevich Fadeev2 More recent studies have included biographical works, such
as those by Viktoriia Khevrolina, David MacKenzie and Ozhan Kapici.3 These studies con-
centrate on Ignatiev’s military and diplomatic career and activities. Although these works
touch on Russia’s pan-Slavic policies in the Balkans, their focus is rather on offering a gen-
eral evaluation of the period’s international relations. Denis Vovchenko and Jelena Miloj-
kovic-Djuric have studied the formation of national identity among Balkan Slavs and the
Russian influence on this process, discussing the national identity of the Balkan Slavic peo-
ple in the context of pan-Slavism and Russian Orthodoxy.4 Only a few studies have directly
addressed the Slavic Benevolent Committee, including those by Sergei Nikitin, Aleksei
Popovkin and Zdenko Zlatar.5 They describe the administrative and institutional establish-
ment of the Committee, but restrict themselves to matters concerning foreign policy. Niki-
tin, a Soviet historian, downplayed the committee’s role as a political actor in the Balkans
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and criticized Western historiography for exaggerating the relation between the Slav
Committee and the Russian government. One of the most recent studies on the Slavic
Benevolent Committee was published in Sofia, by Andrei Andreev, who concentrated on
the cultural activities of the committee, especially in the form of its support for the Bulgar-
ian independence movement and education.6
Although all of these studies have made valuable contributions to the general litera-
ture, they all either lack Russian and Ottoman archival sources or focus narrowly on issues,
like administrative policy, that neglect the impact of pan-Slavism and the form it took in
the Ottoman Balkans between 1856 and 1877. Additionally, they limit themselves to eval-
uating Russia’s policy towards the Ottoman Empire from the perspective of Russian official
foreign policy and Russia’s relations with European states in the second half of the nine-
teenth century. In this article I aim to draw attention to Pan-Slavism’s evolution as a politi-
cal asset from the perspective of two specific Russian actors: Ambassador N.P. Ignatiev
and the Slavic Benevolent Committee. These actors’ strategies towards spreading Russian
influence in the Balkans and their relations with Russian official policy will be the subject
of this article.
In order to understand the importance of the impact of Ignatiev and the Slavic Commit-
tee on the making of foreign policy, one must first appreciate the changes that took place
in the realm of Russian foreign policy from the era of Nicholas I to Alexander II. The Russian
state had proved successful during the final stage of the Napoleonic Wars, and this raised
its prestige among the European Powers. Tsar Nicholas I’s7 foreign policy focused on pre-
serving the European status quo to prevent another war on the continent.8 In part as a
result of this effort, Russia found itself involved in the Crimean War, which was a turning
point for Tsarist diplomacy in the second half of the nineteenth century. Russian failure in
the war revealed its military and economic backwardness9, and diminished Russian pres-
tige in the international arena. Following the Paris Peace Treaty, in an effort to save its
prestige, Russia made a policy adjustment: moving away from Tsar Nicholas I’s inter-
ventionist principles and towards a more peaceful and quiescent strategy. In April 1856,
Alexander Mikhailovich Gorchakov, the former Russian ambassador to Vienna, was
appointed to revise Russia’s foreign policy objective in order to raise the country’s pres-
tige. Although Gorchakov was eager to reformulate the clauses of the Paris Peace Treaty,10
his diplomacy tended towards non-aggressiveness.11
After the Crimean War, Russian economic and political backwardness vis-a-vis Europe
pushed Russia to increase the efficiency of its diplomatic and consular services.12 There-
fore, the diplomatic staff of the Asiatic Department of the Russian Foreign Office were cho-
sen carefully for their regional and technical background.13 Appointees to the Ottoman
Empire constituted the highest percentage of the department’s Foreign Service personnel,
and it was this Asiatic Department that received reports related to the situation of Otto-
man Christian subjects from the diplomatic personnel in Constantinople and the Slavic
Benevolent Committee.14 During the 1860s and 1870s Pan-Slavic sentiments became
especially pronounced in these reports, revealing that Pan-Slavism had begun to affect
Russian diplomats.
Prior to the Crimean War, Pan-Slavism had not experienced widespread official or pub-
lic support. Yet, in the face of the difficult economic conditions of the mid-1870s, Russia
experienced a surge of pan-Slavic sentiment.15 In this period, Russian diplomacy under
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Gorchakov focused on maintaining Russia’s international credibility in order to re-direct
public opinion from domestic problems to the international realm.
In such an international environment Russia needed a period of peace for its military
and economic recovery. However, by the mid-nineteenth century, pan-Slavism had
moved away from its former, predominantly cultural character and came to take on an
increasingly political demeanour. The rise of political pan-Slavic thought ran counter to
and ultimately upended Gorchakov’s strategy of staying away from international conflicts
in order to secure breathing room for the project of Russian modernization.
In this article, I argue that in the second half of the nineteenth century, despite Russia’s
official policy of avoiding conflict with the West, pan-Slavism took on a political character
and began to act as an asset of Russian imperial ideology in the Ottoman Balkans. This ide-
ology was visible basically at two levels. At the personal level, in the case of N.P. Ignatiev16
and his diplomatic mission in Turkey (1864–77), and at the institutional level, in the case
of the Slavic Benevolent Committee, this ideology served to spread Russian influence
among the Slavic Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Sultan.17
This article is divided into four parts: the first describes the differences between West-
ern pan-Slavic thought and Russian pan-Slavism, as well as the evolution of Slavophilism
into political pan-Slavic thought. The next part of the article defines Ignatiev’s diplomatic
methods and pan-Slavic mindset towards the Ottoman Balkans. Rather than simply follow-
ing St. Petersburg’s instructions, Ignatiev generally pursued his own initiatives, and thus
represents the personal level of pan-Slavic propaganda in the region. The third part will
address the Slavic Benevolent Committee, which represents the institutional level of that
propaganda effort. The fourth part will discuss the Ottoman administration’s efforts to
counter Russia’s propaganda activities towards its Slavic Orthodox subjects. Finally, the
article will evaluate the role of Ignatiev and the Slavic Benevolent Committee’s pan-Slavic
activities in the Balkans and how this affected official Russian aims in the region.
The roots of pan-Slavic ideology date back to the Western Slavs in the seventeenth cen-
tury, when the Western and Southern Slavs first desired to unite on an ethnic and cultural
basis without being tied to a particular imperial force. In the nineteenth century, national-
ist and romantic intellectual circles throughout Western and Central Europe re-appropri-
ated earlier seventeenth-century works on the idea of creating a Slavic Union. With the
impact of the French Revolution, Croatians, Slovaks, Slovenians, Serbs and Bulgarians, all
of whom lived under imperial supremacy, began to endeavour to secure their indepen-
dence.18 Although their efforts and writings were nationalistic and separatist in nature,
they did not seek to establish supremacy one over another.
Napoleon’s invasion of Moscow in 1812 increased nationalist sentiment among the
Russian public. The Russian activist group ‘United Slavs’19 (Obshestva Soedinennykh Sla-
vian) desired to create a Slavic Union, but ultimately failed to achieve anything more than
the Dekabrists had. Later, sympathizers of another Russian intellectual movement, the Sla-
vophiles, followed in the footsteps of the United Slavs. These Slavophiles, though ostensi-
bly acting in support of the general idea of Slavic cultural unification, in practice always
worked in the name of increasing Russian superiority over all Slavs.20 The eminent Russian
Slavophile Aleksei Stepanovich Khomiakov asserted that hostile powers (namely Roma-
nians, Hungarians, Germans, Greeks, Turks and Albanians) were located all along the
southern and eastern borders of the different Slavic groups, and their unification would
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threaten Russian sovereignty in the region; therefore, the only solution would be to unite
them under the guidance of Russia, and make Russia the natural centre of the Slavic
world. Public opinion, however, saw the imperialistic ambition behind Khomiakov’s pan-
Slavism, and neither Western Slavs nor the Tsarist government would accept it.21 These
activists believed that they had to preserve Slavic Orthodox civilization against the influ-
ence of the Catholic West.22 According to them, this could only be realized through a pan-
Slavic federation under the leadership of the Russian emperor with Constantinople as its
centre. Yet, during and after the Crimean War, Russian state authorities and intellectual
circles embarked upon a proactive endeavour to bring the forces of the Slavic brother-
lands under imperial Russian leadership against the European West.23
All the efforts of the Western Slavs were for the sake of developing the national con-
sciousness of each group of Slavic people; the idea of the superiority of one Slavic group
over another was not part of their intellectual agenda. On the other hand, Russian inten-
tions were oriented mostly towards liberating them to expand Russian influence and serve
Russian interests.
To understand the form pan-Slavism took in the Russian political sphere, one must com-
prehend its cultural and ideological dimensions, which in turn requires an examination of
its historical, philosophical, and political roots.24 Since the eighteenth century, Russian
intellectuals had sought to reshape their cultural roots. As part of the Romantic agenda of
the nineteenth century, they began to strengthen their ties with Russian folk culture and
distancing themselves from European culture. The noble class became aware of the state’s
backwardness, and they considered the only solution to be the development of an edu-
cated elite class that was less ‘European’ and more ‘Russian’. As a response to the ‘material
enlightenment’ of Europe, Slavophilism offered a ‘spiritual enlightenment’. Thus, through-
out the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century Slavophilism
found an intellectual base among the educated class. This was not a political but a purely
cultural phenomenon, focused on Russian culture, which had two fundamental aspects:
Pravoslavie (Orthodox Christianity) and Slavdom (union of Slavic people).25
Slavophilism emerged in the 1830s during the reign of Nicholas I. Due to the tsar’s
repressive policies, Slavophiles failed to come up with a complete cultural program. Dedi-
cated to Russian culture, they accepted Moscow as their centre rather than St. Petersburg
in a fashion reminiscent of Tsar Peter I’s westernization reforms and the German influence
on the Russian bureaucracy during the period.26 In that sense, it was not a coincidence
that Pan-Slavism and, later, the Slavic Benevolent Committee, with their anti-Western and
anti-Catholic feelings, chose Moscow as their centre.
During Nicholas I’s reign, Russian intellectuals were prejudiced towards Orthodoxy and
Slavdom, because the popular tendency of that era was European-oriented. However, the
death of Nicholas I (1855) was a turning point for the development of Slavophilism. By
that time, Russian society had already split into two factions, radicals and conservatives,
with the latter seeking to preserve ‘autocracy’ rather than fight for revolutionary change.27
These factions later were transformed into separate political and cultural groups, one of
which was pan-Slavists. Although pan-Slavists’ starting point was the same as Slavophiles,
namely the cultural and moral enlightenment of Russian society, over the course of time it
became politicized around the Balkan issue. Ivan Vasilyevich Kireevsky and Aleksei Stepa-
novich Khomiakov, the fathers of Slavophilism, formulated pan-Slavism on the basis of
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 335
religion and culture; yet, between the lines, this cultural connection carried the potential
of a Slavic Union under the Russian leadership of a ‘Vseslavianskii Tsar’ (Emperor of all
Slavs).28 On the other hand, at the very beginning, Slavophiles did not espouse the idea of
Russian domination over the Slavic nations. But over the course of the political develop-
ments of the nineteenth century, their ideology began to turn towards becoming the pre-
dominant power in the world. As a result, the culturally oriented Slavophile idea gave way
to a pan-Slavic political and diplomatic agenda.29
Throughout the 1860s pan-Slavic ideology spread among the Russian bureaucrats, and its
most ardent representative was N.P. Ignatiev. His primary goal was to reverse the degrad-
ing terms of the Paris Treaty, and to change the destiny of Bessarabia in parallel with Rus-
sia’s interests.30 Ignatiev used pan-Slavic ideology as a foreign policy tool in his relations
with the Austrian and Ottoman Slavs to reach his goals. In the mid-nineteenth century,
the pan-Slavic movement spread among intellectuals, whose motivations were mostly cul-
tural and religious. However, that ideology did more to serve the interests of the Russian
political class in their quest for dominance in the Balkans than it did to protect their Slavic
brothers and coreligionists.
Pan-Slavic ideology had a limited impact on tsarist foreign policy during the interwar
period (1856–77). The European-minded Minister of Foreign Affairs Gorchakov31 was not
in favour of nationalistic sentiments, which had the potential to overshadow the relation-
ship between Russia and the West.32 Gorchakov’s concerns were visible in his policy of
censorship towards pan-Slav journals.33 Karl Vasilievich Nesselrode, the Minister of Foreign
Affairs (1822–56), stood behind preserving the European balance of power, as did the Aus-
trian diplomat Metternich, one of the main actors of the Congress of Vienna (1815). Both
of them considered radical nationalist movements as one of the main threats to the Euro-
pean balance of power established during the Congress. In that sense, pan-Slavic ideas
were banded together with the liberal and national ideas widespread in central and West-
ern Europe in the 1830s and 1840s. In this, Gorchakov followed the same internal and
external political line as had his predecessor Nesselrode, and considered Ignatiev’s pan-
Slavic attitudes as an untimely and misguided exercise in bravado.34
Under the administration of Alexander II and Gorchakov, pan-Slavists generally lacked
official support. Thus, in that period they were known more for their cultural activities
than for their political acts. Since Russia’s foreign policy aimed to avoid complications
with Europe, Russian official circles strove to distance themselves from any radical ten-
dency.35 The government was especially afraid of the idea of a Slavic Union under Russian
leadership.36 Nevertheless, Ignatiev’s diplomacy was different from the official Russian pol-
icy of the interwar period (1856-77).
On personal level, Ignatiev was the most influential representative of Russian Pan-Slavism
in diplomacy.37 From the beginning of his diplomatic career in Constantinople in 1864, his
activities were orientated towards exploring the vulnerable situation of Orthodox Slavs
under Ottoman rule.38 Before becoming Russian ambassador in Constantinople, during
his tenure as director of the Asiatic Department (1861–64) he believed that the most sig-
nificant goal for Russia on the international stage would be to revise the Paris Treaty and
to strengthen the Russian position over the Straits. He also believed in the future impor-
tance of the support of the Balkan Slavs and the need to organize them under Russian
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political guidance. According to him, the territory of Bessarabia – lost at the Paris Peace
Treaty – should be returned to Russia; moreover, the neutral status of the Black Sea and
the limitations on Russian naval forces in it should be annulled.39 Though Ignatiev’s politi-
cal project had much in common with Gorchakov’s ideas in regards to the Paris Peace
Treaty, they differed in terms of their diplomatic methods.40 Gorchakov followed a tradi-
tional diplomatic approach, giving primacy to bargaining, while Ignatiev was in favour of
informal and personal contact with the Ottoman bureaucrats and the Sultan himself.41
Although Gorchakov was also uncomfortable with the Paris Treaty’s degrading conditions,
his diplomatic intentions lay at odds with those of Ignatiev. Gorchakov was an enthusiastic
admirer of the ‘Concert of Europe’, and considered it to provide a real basis for successful
diplomacy. In contrast, Ignatiev distrusted the European powers and believed they were
trying to isolate Russia by forming an ‘anti-Russian coalition’.42
In 1861, Ignatiev was appointed as the director of the Asiatic Department.43 During his
first years at the department, Ignatiev maintained close relations with pan-Slav circles
through Ivan Sergeevich Aksakov (1823–86), Vladimir Aleksandrovich Cherkassky (1824–
78), Fyodor Ivanovich Tiutchev (1803–73) and Yurii Fyodorovich Samarin (1819–76).44 In
parallel with his nationalist views, Ignatiev formulated a Russian foreign policy opposing
Catholic and Protestant influences in the Balkans.45 He believed ‘Russia should keep its
hand on these nations’46 to preserve Russia’s strategic interests. From the perspective of
Russia’s contemporary political plans concerning the Ottoman Balkans, Ignatiev’s pan-
Slavism differed totally from the earlier Slavophilism of the 1840s and 1850s. Rather than
a cultural movement, for him pan-Slavism meant strengthening Russian positions in the
Balkans and Near East. He was convinced that Russia remained isolated and in danger of
losing its influence in south-eastern Europe because of the Paris Peace Agreement. He
indicated that although the Crimean War had been fought to increase Russian glory in the
international arena, in practice it resulted in a total loss of prestige.47
Before his appointment to Constantinople, Ignatiev had already adopted a course of
action aimed at increasing Russian influence in the Balkan Peninsula. Throughout his ten-
ure at the Asiatic Department, Ignatiev laid the foundations for his diplomatic actions dur-
ing his ambassadorship in Constantinople.48 In a secret letter to Gorchakov, Ignatiev drew
attention to two important tasks: soothing tensions among the Serbian, Montenegrin, Bul-
garian and Greek peoples and preventing a possible alliance between the Serbian and
Montenegrin Slavs under Habsburg authority. He opined that the pro-Russian Serbian
Prince Mikhail could be the head of a future Serbo-Bulgarian state, while the Bulgarians
could only be a ‘raw-material, as they lack well-educated elite.’49 In 1866/67 he wrote that
the Balkan people – including Greeks, Montenegrins, Serbians and Albanians – had
become closer and that a general Orthodox-Slav revolt against Ottoman rule had become
a real possibility. However, for Ignatiev, the critical point was the possibility of Western
interference in Balkan affairs; and in that unwanted case Russian foreign policy both in
the Balkans and in the Ottoman Empire would have been jeopardized. Ignatiev believed
that the Orthodox Slavs should never gain their independence without Russian help;
therefore, until they were ready, Russia should work to preserve its influence in the region
and encourage them to rise against the Porte at the right moment, in accordance with
Russia’s imperial interests.50
Ignatiev desired to be appointed to the Constantinople mission in order to freely con-
duct his own diplomatic strategy at the Porte.51 Actually, his appointment to
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Constantinople was the first diplomatic triumph of pan-Slavism.52 Russia’s Balkan affairs
moved into a new stage after Ignatiev began to apply his ambitious plans concerning the
Ottoman Balkans. Nevertheless, there were some bureaucratic limits on pan-Slavism that
indicate the ideology was not officially supported by St. Petersburg, at least during the
interwar period (1856–77).53 Ignatiev’s ambitious plans caused tension between him and
Petr Nikolaievich Stremoukhov, the head of the Asiatic Department between 1864 and
1875.54 Moreover, European-oriented Russian diplomatic circles headed by Minister of
Foreign Affairs Gorchakov were suspicious of Ignatiev’s actions, which risked triggering
national movements in the Balkans. A number of Russian experts in Balkan affairs found
Ignatiev’s plans to be troubling, including Minister of War Dimitrii Alekseevich Miliutin,
Minister of Finance Count Mikhail Khristoforovich Reitern and Aleksandr Mikhailovich
Gorchakov, as well as many diplomats.55
At the institutional level, an important actor that played a significant role in Russia’s Balkan
political strategy was the Slavic Benevolent Committee. Pan-Slavism took on an institu-
tional form with the formation of the Moscow Slavic Benevolent Committee (Moskovskii
Slavianskii Blogatvaritelnyi Komitet)56 in 1858. After the Crimean defeat, the Russian For-
eign Ministry aimed at increasing Russia’s relations with the Balkan states. To this end, the
Slavic Benevolent Committee was founded under the management of the Asiatic depart-
ment. At the end of the 1850s, pan-Slavic propaganda began to gain importance partially
as a result of the initiatives of that institution. Within ten years the Committee expanded
its activities and increased its administrative manpower.57 Three other branches emerged
out of the committee: the St. Petersburg Committee in 1868, the Kiev Committee in 1869
and the Odessa Committee in 1870.58 While the members of the St. Petersburg Commit-
tee were high-ranking bureaucrats and army officers, the Moscow Committee members
included Slavophile elites from business and intellectual circles.59 While the Moscow Slavic
Committee initially had few members, thanks to its networking strategy it managed to
establish close contacts within different strata of society, including influential bureaucrats.
These social connections developed the committee’s efficiency and area of influence both
in Russia and in the Balkans during the 1870s.60
Aleksei Nikolaevich Bahmetev (1798–1861) was the head of the Moscow Slavic Com-
mittee between 1860 and 1861. After his death, he was replaced by Mikhail Petrovich
Pogodin (1800–75). Pogodin soon became one of the leading proponents of the politiciza-
tion of pan-Slavism, and was the first person to espouse the idea of a Slavic Union, even
before Nikolai Yakovlevich Danilevskii (1822–85). Pogodin used the journals he published
to attract the attention of Slavophiles.61 In 1854, in the midst of the Crimean War, he
came up with the idea of a Danubian Union (Dunaiskii Soiuz), which was to comprise Hun-
gary, Greece, Moldova, Valachia and Transilvania. According to Pogodin, Constantinople
was to be the centre of this union and Russia its head. His project is widely accepted as a
milestone in the movement towards cultural and political Slavic unification and as paving
the way for future Russian political pan-Slavic propaganda. During Pogodin’s leadership
between 1861 and 1875, the committee strengthened its connection with pan-Slavist
intellectuals and scientists abroad, which helped it to establish ties with the Western Slavs.
He intended to incite European and Slavic public opinion over the situation of Orthodox
Slavs under Ottoman rule. Thus, the ‘Slav question’ began to be mentioned as a subtitle of
the Eastern Question.62
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The main activities of the Slavic Committee can be classified as donating to Balkan Ortho-
dox schools, establishing Slavic centres in public libraries, funding Orthodox Slav students
from the Balkans for their education in Russia, collecting donations from wealthy people,
organizing public activities for monetary support and publishing newspapers63 in Russia
to propagate Russian pan-Slavism. In order to maintain the smooth functioning of the
committee, both in terms of money and material, its financial records were strictly kept.64
Russian Balkan missionaries in the field used these committee funds for propaganda pur-
poses. Their main purpose was to create local followers of Russian pan-Slav and imperial
policies in the Balkans. In its early years, the committee succeeded in establishing a useful
network of close relations with the members of consulates and officers of the Asiatic
Department.65 All these educational, publishing and funding activities aimed at enhancing
Russian cultural and political weight and influence in the Balkans. For instance, the
committee insisted that correspondence between individuals in the Balkans and the
committee had to be carried out in Russian.66 These activities served to spread a Russian-
centred pan-Slav atmosphere in the Ottoman Balkans.
The Russian government obtained information about the situation in the Ottoman
Empire through the Asiatic Department and the Russian Embassy in Constantinople. On
this point, the Slavic Benevolent Committee’s actions were in accordance with the govern-
ment. The existence of an organizational body active in the Balkans that was independent
from the official administration provided Russian bureaucratic elites with advantage, as
they would not share responsibility for the committee’s actions.67 The Asiatic Department
controlled each donation and every act of the committee, and it regularly requested infor-
mation concerning the progress of the Slav beneficiary students.68 The Russian govern-
ment paid special attention to these beneficiaries, whom it envisioned as future
Russophile activists in the region. The Balkan Slavs who were sent to Moscow specialized
in such areas as theology, medicine, law and philology. Graduates of these fields moved
onto careers in these various specializations that brought them in close contact with the
public. It is therefore no coincidence that the committee preferred to support students in
these particular fields. These students, in their letters to the committee, promised to return
to their homelands after finishing their education in Russia, and the Russian high adminis-
tration paid great importance to this.69 Russian officials believed the Slavic students who
were educated in Russian would imbibe its culture and language, and in the future would
serve as the main supporters of Russian political and military activities against the Porte.
Where prior to the committee’s foundation Russian agents were provoking Bulgarian
peasants to refuse to pay their taxes and to rise against the Porte,70 after the establish-
ment of the Slavic Benevolent Committee, Russia’s strategy for strengthening its active
position in the Balkans shifted to a higher level.
Both Ignatiev and the Slavic Benevolent Committee focused on Bulgaria in their activi-
ties.71 The Bulgarian instructors (uchiteli) who were sent to Moscow by the committee for
their higher education upon their return would teach partially in the Russian language in
Bulgarian schools.72 It was for this reason that Ignatiev paid special attention to ensure
that Bulgarian students were awarded bursaries from the committee.73 These students,
upon their return to their own country, became Russophile activists and supporters of Rus-
sian policies in the Balkans.74 In practice, the committee’s primary concern was far
removed from the formation of a national consciousness amongst the Orthodox Slavs
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under Ottoman rule. Most of the donations and scholarships were oriented towards the
support of either Orthodox Christianity or Russian culture and language. These attempts
contributed to Russia’s interests rather than helping either the Bulgarians or other Slavic
peoples to develop their own national unity.75
The Ottoman authorities, for their part, were critical about these developments. They
understood that the Bulgarians, especially the Russophiles, would become an instrument
in the hands of Russian politicians.76 They were aware that the committee would try to
increase Russian influence amongst Bulgarians through its educational activities. Accord-
ingly, the Ottoman administration tried to address the situation so as to avoid jeopar-
dizing Ottoman territorial integrity and the success of the Tanzimat reforms.77 European
governments were also uncomfortable with Russia’s plans in the Balkan Peninsula.
France and England paid special attention to Ignatiev’s personal relations with the Otto-
man palace and Grand Vizier Mahmud Nedim Paşa. They preferred to keep the Otto-
man administration free of Russian influence, which they felt would hamper Western
interests.78
The Slavic Benevolent Committee’s actions and Ignatiev’s diplomatic and personal
attempts threatened the Tanzimat reforms and aimed at supporting national movements
that would eventually serve tsarist interests. On the other hand, Western pan-Slavic ideas
acted mainly in the name of the cultural unity of the Balkan peoples, bolstering and sup-
porting the ethnic and national sentiments of each group. For example, Croatian bishop
Josip Juraj Strossmayer, who worked for the idea of Slavic unification in the Balkans, sup-
ported the idea of the equality79 of all Slavic nations and groups, and believed that Europe
should not consider them as ‘elements etrangers’80 living in the continent. According to
him, the Eastern Question should be solved on the basis of Christianity and freedom by
supporting the Southern Slavs, in accordance with the way Western Europe supported
other Christian communities.81 Specifically in the Bulgarian case, though he was a Catholic
bishop, Strossmayer admired the idea of an independent Bulgarian Church, and consid-
ered a nation-centred solution to the Bulgarian Church Question.82 As a part of his cultural
activities in that field, he collected and supported the publication of Bulgarian folk songs
at his own expense.83 Prominent among the other intellectuals who contributed to the
development of Bulgarian national awareness were the Miladinov brothers from Western
Macedonia, who collected Bulgarian folk songs and poems,84 the Czech-Bulgarian archae-
ologists Hermengild and Karel Skorpil,85 the Czech historian and politician Konstantin Ire-
chek86 and Ivan Mrkvicka,87 who contributed to national art and painting in Bulgaria. This
is to say that while Russia’s activities were mainly oriented towards ending Ottoman rule
and increasing its own influence in the Balkan Peninsula, Western Slavs’ cultural efforts
had a very different goal, namely improving their own national consciousness.88
Russia’s view of Eastern Slavs as inferiors that should obey Russian supremacy can be
observed in the statements of nineteenth-century Russian historian Vladimir Ivanovich
Lamanskii at the Slavic Ethnographic Exhibition in 1867. Lamanskii stated that Russia
wanted to include non-Russian Slavs into its ethnographic exhibition not because it
believed that their Slavic character was equal to that of Russian Slavs, but instead because
Russia wanted to be kind to ‘these weak Slav brothers’ by granting them this historical
and ethnographical right. He thought that this would make Russia a strong leader for the
Slav nations and that the Russian language would be the official language among them.
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According to him, this type of pan-Slavism would only bring a Russification rather than an
equal brotherhood.89
The Ottoman administration was aware that Ignatiev’s diplomacy and the Committee’s
activities would eventually cause internal disturbances. European governments90 also
warned the Ottomans about this danger.91 Ottoman sources from the period reveal that
the Ottoman administration was aware of Russia’s activities. One such source is the mem-
oires of Midhat Paşa. Midhat Paşa was the first Ottoman governor of the Danubian vilayet
(province),92 where he enacted a series of administrative reforms. He tried to modernize
the education system in the province for both Bulgarians and the Turks. He also estab-
lished a bilingual provincial newspaper, published in Turkish and Bulgarian, in Tuna
(Dunav) and conducted a financial administrative reform program in the province. Midhat
Paşa’s modernization project served at once to develop the province and to create a bar-
rier against Russian intentions in the region.93 He wrote that in 1866 in Kiev, Bucharest
and Kishinev a number of Slavic committees had worked to raise armed groups to pro-
voke Bulgarians to revolt against the government. He complained that Russians were
encouraging and funding thousands of Bulgarian students to receive an education in Rus-
sia, and that all of these students were returning to Bulgaria to work as agents spreading
Russian propaganda. He additionally wrote that Russian propaganda, through its great
number of publications, was working to poison European public opinion against the Otto-
mans concerning the situation of Bulgarians under Ottoman rule. He emphasized that in
these activities Ignatiev played the most significant role.94
Compared to the Slavic Benevolent Committee’s propaganda, Ignatiev’s personal and
unofficial efforts among both locals and the Ottoman bureaucracy produced more direct
and proactive results for Russia’s Balkan policy. Ignatiev did not strictly follow the official
Russian policy towards the Ottoman state; his diplomatic and military tactics were differ-
ent from the central orders he received. From time to time Gorchakov would send warn-
ing letters to Ignatiev in order to make him follow state policy rather than his own
initiatives.95 Even Stremoukhov, the head of the Asiatic Department, who became aware
of Ignatiev’s secret activities after he received a report from the Russian agent Naiden
Gerov in 1867, grew restless about Ignatiev’s secret financial and political support to the
Bulgarian revolutionary committees in Bucharest.96
Ignatiev considered the success of the Tanzimat reform as one of the biggest threats to
Russian political plans in the Balkans. In his memoires, Ignatiev wrote that if the reforms
had achieved their aims it would have meant equality and prosperity in the everyday life
of the Balkan Slavs. In other words, the success of the Tanzimat would have weakened
Russia’s hand in the region.97 Thus, in order to undermine the success of the reforms he
felt it was necessary to intensify anti-Ottoman propaganda.98 On this point, Ottoman
reports from the Tuna provincial authorities included many complaints concerning Igna-
tiev’s plans to incite a Bulgarian rebellion against the Porte.99 These situations were not
limited to the Russian ambassador’s intrigues. From letters addressed to the Benevolent
Committee, it becomes clear that as a result of Russian propaganda, armed groups began
to emerge amongst the Bulgarians and Serbs.100 Armed banditry in Rumelia was a com-
mon occurrence and a significant problem for the Ottoman authorities, but in these pro-
paganda letters the Turkish banditry groups were described as killers and a bane to the
Bulgarian population. The same bandits from the Bulgarian or Serbian side, however,
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were proclaimed as freedom fighters, and these freedom fighters were portrayed as con-
stituting the vanguard that would go on to form the basis of national liberation move-
ments.101 Russia approached these ‘freedom fighters’ with sympathy, as they were agents
that aided in disrupting the rule of the Ottoman government. Both the Ottoman govern-
ment and its high official Midhat Paşa were well aware that the brigands were assisted by
the Russian government for the purposes of disrupting the stability of the region and the
progress of the Tanzimat.102 In the context of these letters, Russian propaganda aimed to
cause suspicion amongst the Orthodox Christian about the efficiency of Tanzimat reforms.
The Ottoman administration was deeply worried about the activities of Ignatiev and
the Slavic Benevolent Committee discussed above. These pan-Slavic activities had
become so disturbing that the Ottoman bureaucracy developed plans to counter their
influence. The Ottoman archives and memoirs reveal the Porte’s uneasiness with pan-Slav-
ism in the Balkans. In this context, Midhat Paşa developed a number of means to counter
these activities, the prominent example being the Tuna vilayet reforms. In a similar man-
ner to Gorchakov, the Porte preferred to avoid any tension that would disturb the peace-
ful atmosphere in the Balkan Peninsula. However, such pan-Slavic activities ran counter to
this aim.
Conclusion
The starting point of Russia’s foreign policy from the eighteenth century onwards was to
eliminate Ottoman influence in the Balkans and strengthen Russia’s political and cultural
supremacy over the Balkan Slavic peoples, rather than supporting their national con-
sciousness. This mindset was reflected in Ignatiev’s efforts and the Slavic Benevolent Com-
mittee’s activities. As we can observe in the Ottoman archival documents and memoirs,
the Ottoman administration was highly suspicious of these efforts, which served to under-
mine the effectiveness of Tanzimat reforms. Additionally, European states tried to warn
the Porte about the danger posed by these activities on a number of occasions in order to
prevent the success of Russia’s plans in the Balkan Peninsula. Ignatiev played the main
role in support of Russia’s pan-Slavic intentions in the region. The committee, when it was
first formed, focused on humanitarian aid and religious charity, but over time it became
more of a Russian propaganda asset. In fact, pan-Slavists lacked any official support from
St. Petersburg, since the Russian Foreign Minister Gorchakov strove to avoid any complica-
tions with European powers after the Crimean War. It would be an exaggeration to assert
that pan-Slavism was the main driving force behind Russian foreign policy in the Balkans
during the interwar period. However, the initiatives of Ignatiev and activities of the Slavic
Benevolent Committee increased the tension between the Russian and Ottoman govern-
ments, which in turn upset the Russian government’s strategy to overcome the Paris
Peace Treaty’s failure in a peaceful atmosphere.
Scholars with an interest in the history of the Balkans and Russo-Ottoman relations
evaluate Russia’s policies in the region as constituting part of a broader unitary and coher-
ent foreign policy strategy. This study, in contrast, has argued that Russian political aims
in the Ottoman Balkans were influenced more by the acts of N.P. Ignatiev and the Slavic
Benevolent Committee than they were by the preferences of St. Petersburg. On this point,
these two Russian, pan-Slavist actors deserve greater attention in the effort to better
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understand the interwar period of Russo-Ottoman relations and Russia’s impact on Balkan
nation-building in the late-nineteenth and early twentieth century.
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lesi Hâzırası (Dersaadet: 1328).
33. These Pan-Slavic journals, such as Den, Moskvich, Parus and Moskva, were unpopular among
the bureaucracy, and were frequently censured. M.S. Anderson, The Eastern Question (New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1966), p.171.
34. Kohn, Pan-Slavism, pp.126–7.
35. See GARF, f.828, first expedition, op.1, d.1434, 149; GARF, f.828, first expedition, op.1, d.1434,
230–2; GARF, f.828, first expedition, op.1, d.1435, 6–8.
36. At the 1867 Congress, when the tsar met with Czech historian Frantisek Palacky and publicist
Frantisek Ladislav Rieger, he avoided discussing politics. See Guins, ‘The Politics of “Pan-
Slavism”’, p.126.
37. Ignatiev’s audacity in this regard derived partly from the support he received from Russian aris-
tocracy from the very beginning of his military and diplomatic career. Ignatiev came from a
well-known family whose roots went back to the fourteenth century. His royal blood brought
him the title of ‘Count’ in 1877. Most of the predecessors of the Ignatiev family were military
men. His father Pavel Nikholaevich Ignatiev was the General of the Armies and the President
of the Committee of Ministers. For more information on his background, see: Khevrolina, Niko-
lai Pavlovich Ignatiev, p.14; and Strakhovsky, ‘General Count N.P. Ignatiev and the Pan-Slav
Movement’, p.224. In June 1861, Ignatiev married Princess Ekaterina Golitsina, great-grand-
daughter of Marshal Mikhail Kutuzov, the Russian commander who destroyed the Grand Army
of Napoleon I in 1812. In addition to his surname, which earned him respect among high-rank
officials, this marriage brought him the support of the Russian aristocracy. On this point, see
MacKenzie, Count N.P. Ignat’ev, p.203. From the very beginning of Ignatiev’s appointment to
Constantinople, Gorchakov had a great deal of faith in him. Part of Gorchakov’s feelings came
from his respect for Ignatiev’s father. On this point, see: GARF, f.828, first expedition, op.1.
d.1434, 295–7; GARF, f.828, first expedition, op.1., d.1435, 76–7. Ignatiev’s family connections
and success in foreign diplomatic missions brought him respect from the highest ranks of the
tsardom. His missions in Khiva, Bukhara and Beijing won him the favour of Tsar Aleksandr II,
and led to his appointment as director of the Asiatic Department. On this point, see Ritchie,
‘The Asiatic Department’, pp.299–300.
38. For Ignatiev’s biography and diplomatic career, see: Khevrolina, Nikolai Pavlovich Ignatiev;
MacKenzie, Count N.P. Ignat’ev; and Kapıcı, ‘Osmanlı-Rus _Ilişkilerinde N.P. _Ignatyev D€onemi’.
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Balkans et être le ciment qui relie les différentes races coreligionnaires entre elles.” See, Graf
N.P. Ignatiev, Arkhivite govoriat No.48, p.246.
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 345
47. “Au milieu toutes ces combinaisons politiques…la Russie seule etait completement isolee; elle
n’avait aucun point d’appui pour servir de base a son action et son influence sur les Turcs
s’etait a cette epoque presque entierement eteinte...La resistance hero€ıque que nous avions
opposee aux armees reunies des plus grandes Puissances du monde n’etait pas faite pour
diminuer notre prestige et notre gloire.” See, Graf N.P. Ignatiev, Arkhivite govoriat No. 48, p.8.
48. Ritchie, ‘The Asiatic Department’, p.317.
49. “…blgrite predstavliavakha zasega samo surov material, bez dostatchno kadri”, see Ignatiev,
Zapiski (1875–1878), p.57.
50. Secret letter from Ignatiev to Gorchakov, 27 Dec. 1866. Ignatiev, Zapiski (1875–1878), pp.56–64.
51. Ritchie, ‘The Asiatic Department’, p.319.
52. Strakhovsky, ‘General Count N.P. Ignatiev and the Pan-Slav Movement’, p.227. The conduct of
Near Eastern policy was directly under the responsibility of Gorchakov and the ambassador at
Constantinople. Ignateiv’s predecessor in Constantinople was Prince A.B. Lobanov-Rastovskii.




55. Ibid., p.318; GARF, f.828, first expedition, op.1, d.1434, 149.
56. The reports and letters concerning the Moscow Slavic Benevolent Committee are located at
GARF, f. no. 1750.
57. Nikitin, Slavianskie Komitety v Rossii v 1858–1876 godakh, pp.35–6.
58. Ibid., p.45. The three other branches of the Committee were founded under Pogodin’s adminis-
tration of the Moscow branch. These committees provided support in the form of money and
books, especially to divinity schools. They opened Slavic centres in public libraries and donated
books to cities in the Balkans. Russian professors gave public lectures and seminars, the pro-
ceeds from which were donated to needy Slavs. In 1875-76 Kiev Committee gathered 34,933
roubles to support Montenegrins and Bulgarians. In general, the Moscow Committee and its
three other divisions obtained high praises from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and operated on a
budget of up to 1000 silver roubles annually from the Ministry. See Popovkin, ‘Slavianskie Bla-
gotvaritel’nie Obshestva’, pp.67–85.
59. Zlatar, ‘For the Sake of Slavdom’, p.255. Nikitin notes that the Moscow Committee was not
composed only of Pan-Slavists, but also of people from different classes and views. However,
he admits that the archival sources concerning the details of members have not been pre-
served, and that therefore much cannot be said about the pan-Slavic views of the members.
See Nikitin, Slavianskie Komitety v Rossii v 1858–1876 godakh, pp.40, 57.
60. This network included Russian empress Maria Aleksandrovna, the metropolitan bishop Philaret
(Drozdov), the archpriest Ioann Kronshtatskii (Sergiev), famous Russian writers F.M. Dostoevskii,
L.N. Tolstoi and F.I. Tiutchev, famous Russian chemist D.I. Mendeleev, composer P.I. Tchaikov-
skii, Russian historian and journalist M.P. Pogodin, Slavophile writer I.S. Aksakov, Russian art col-
lectors P.M. and S.M. Tretiakovi, Minister of National Education I.D. Delianov and Russian
generals A.A. Kireev, M.G. Cherniaev and R.A. Fadeev. In addition, many historians, specialists
of medicine, philologists, philosophers, sociologists, economists and pedagogues were associ-
ates of the Moscow Slavic Benevolent Committee. See: Anderson, The Eastern Question, p.171;
Sumner, ‘Russia and Panslavism’, pp.29–34; Popovkin, ‘Slavianskie Blagotvaritel’nie Obshestva’,
pp.4–5.
61. In 1827 Pogodin founded the journalMoskovskii Vestnik which was based on the idea of ‘Ortho-
doxy, Autocracy, Nationality’, which was put forward by the minister of education S.S. Uvarov.
Between 1841 and 1854 he published Moskovitianin. The main topics of this journal were Rus-
sian culture, history and folklore. Popovkin, ‘Slavianskie Blagotvaritel’nie Obshestva’, pp.67–85.
62. In addition to Pogodin, another prominent name from the committee was Nil Aleksandr
Popov, professor at Moscow University. He was seen as a guardian among the Slavs who came
to Russia for education. Bulgarians, Serbians and sometimes Czechs and Slovaks, following
their arrival in Moscow, would visit Popov to ask for his support. See. Popovkin, ‘Slavianskie Bla-
gotvaritel’nie Obshestva’, pp.67–85.
346 A. YIGIT G€ULSEVEN
63. Nikitin, Slavianskie Komitety v Rossii v 1858–1876 godakh, pp.36–7; The Tsarist government fre-
quently censored Pan-Slavist publications; however they continued to be issued under differ-
ent names. These publications included Russkaia Beseda (1856–60), Molva (1857), Parus (1859),
Den (1861–65), Moskva (1867–69), Moskvich (1867–68) and Rus (1880–85). See Popovkin, ‘Sla-
vianskie Blagotvaritel’nie Obshestva’, pp.86–98.
64. GARF, f.1750. first expedition, op.1, d. 64, p.17, 53, 56; GARF, f.1750, first expedition, op.1, d. 70,
2, 21, 45, 57.
65. Popovkin, ‘Slavianskie Blagotvaritel’nie Obshestva’, p.65.
66. GARF, f.1750. first expedition, op.1, d. 64, p.17.
67. Nikitin, Slavianskie Komitety v Rossii v 1858–1876 godakh, pp.35–6.
68. GARF, f.1750, first expedition, op.1, d.64, 53; GARF, f.1750, op.1, 70, pp.21, 56.
69. For example see, GARF, f.1750, first expedition, op.1, d.227, 12, (16.3.1866)
70. BOA _I.MTZ, No.8, 16/Za/1259.
71. The committee supported several institutions in Bulgaria, including the Bulgarian Church and
school community (Bolgarskaia Tserkovno-Shkolnaia Obshina), the publication of ‘Bulgarian
pamphlets’ (Bolgarskie Knizhnitsi), and the Bulgarian printing house in Constantinople (Bolgar-
skaia Tipographia v Konstatinopole), which received the greatest proportion of these dona-
tions – 800 roubles, almost double what the other institutions received. In the first three of
years of its foundation the committee spent a total of 10,000 roubles. See Popovkin, ‘Sla-
vianskie Blagotvaritel’nie Obshestva’, pp.64–5.
72. GARF, f.1750, first expedition, op.1, d.70, pp.34–5.
73. GARF, f.1750, first expedition, op.1, d.352.
74. GARF, f.1750, first expedition, op.1, d.64, pp.23, 45–7, 53, 67; GARF, f.1750, first expedition, op.1,
d.226, 12. The committee paid special attention to the education of Bulgarian women, espe-
cially in the 1870s. As an example of this attention, in 1872, Ignatiev helped several Bulgarian
girls attain places at the Moscow Aleksandrovskii Monastery. GARF, f.1750, first expedition,
op.1, d.64, pp.23, 67.
75. Ignatiev, Zapiski (1875–1878), pp.56–64.
76. The eminent Turkish historian Halil Inalcik suggests that it would be simplistic to say that Bal-
kan uprisings were the direct result of Russian propaganda. He argues that although Russian
Pan-Slavism was effective in mobilising local peasants, the immediate cause of uprisings in the
Balkans was the taxation policy of the Ottoman gospodarlık regime. For this and more on the
Ottoman gospodarlık regime and Russian policy, see Halil _Inalcık, Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi
(_Istanbul: Eren, 1992), pp.38–72. The Ottoman archives contain an interesting account of how,
in the 1870s, Ottoman Bulgarian subjects were encouraged by pan-Slavists to emigrate to Rus-
sia and Serbia from the region of Rumelia. After a short period they demanded to return
home, but upon their return found that their living conditions, which had forced them to quit
Ottoman soil in the first place, had grown even worse. On this, see BOA _I. MTZ, No.73.16/R/
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K€ult€ur Yayınları, 2012).
93. See Ali Haydar Midhat Bey, The Life of Midhat Pasha (London: John Murray, 1903), pp.32–66; G.
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